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The Determinants of Foreclosures for Single-Family Homes in the United States
Abstract
What are the key determinants causing the current record number of foreclosures? To answer this, the
study will use the most recent national foreclosure data and attempt to find a model with results that can
be interpreted to suggest potential policy implications.
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The Determinants of Foreclosures for
Single-Family Homes in the United
States
Bryan Duling

I. Introduction
In the United States, homeownership creates numerous benefits for individuals, families
and society and is the cornerstone of the “American dream.” Low foreclosure rates of residential
mortgages and the stigmatism associated with the
term foreclosure are indicative of the value that
Americans put on owning their homes. However, the rate of mortgages entering the foreclosure
process during the 2nd quarter of 2007 was 0.65%.
This rate is the highest in history, up seven basis points from the first quarter, twenty-two basis
points from 2006 and showing no signs of a decrease (Ackerman, 2007). Below, Figure 1 shows
the percentage of homes that were in foreclosure at
the end of the quarter from 1995 to 2007. Figure 1
illustrates how the current number of foreclosures
is close to surpassing the foreclosure totals seen
during the post September 11th recession.
Although still a small percentage of all
mortgage originations, defaults and subsequent
foreclosures are large in absolute numbers and
produce crushing losses to lenders and investors,
higher finance costs to consumers, and devastating damage to borrowers and homeowners directly affected. The entire macroeconomy is beginning to feel the effects with the real possibility of

increased unemployment due to a recession that is
imminently looming. This paper analyzes factors
that cause borrowers to default on their mortgages
and lose their homes to foreclosure.
National foreclosure proceedings have
been inflated by significant increases in California, Florida, Nevada, and Arizona. These markets
are dominated by investor loans, which are loans
to buyers who do not plan on living in the houses.
Nationally, home prices have fallen by 3% causing investors to abandon their mortgages, driving
up foreclosure rates. These markets are also dominated by subprime loans: deals offered by lenders to borrowers with blemished credit histories
that have higher rates of interest. During this period of subprime lending, underwriting standards
were lowered and new affordability products such
as extra-long term, interest only mortgages, and
loans with low teaser interest rates that balloon after a few years (hybrid mortgages) were offered
(Ackerman, 2007). While more than a third of all
subprime adjustable rate loans are in the previous
four Southern states, Ohio and Michigan are two
Midwestern states contributing to the foreclosure
problem. These troubles are driven by economic
problems created by job losses in the manufacturing and the auto industries (Ackerman, 2007).
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Many lenders, such as Countrywide Financial,
have suffered enormous losses after late payments
and subsequent defaults mounted. General Motors, the world’s largest carmaker, is in danger of
having to take a $1 billion charge to cover bad
mortgage loans of its subsidiary, Residential Capital (“Subprime”, 2007).
Thanks to problems in the subprime mortgage sector, the subsequent decline in housing
Figure 1: % of Loans in Foreclosure at End of Quarter
1.60

literature on the topic of foreclosures and related
theory. Section III and IV explain the data and then
lay out an empirical framework, respectively. The
model includes traditional determinants of foreclosure, current lending practices, and economic
conditions. With the modeling framework laid
out, Section V discusses the results from estimation of the model. Finally, Section VI presents a
detailed summary of the findings, possible policy
implications and avenues for future
research.
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II. Review of the Literature and
Theoretical Model
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Many studies throughout
0.80
the late 20th century have looked
% of Loans in Foreclosure
0.60
at the determinants of foreclosure.
0.40
Traditionally, these determinants
have included unemployment rates,
0.20
change in interest rates, loan-to0.00
value ratios, and home price appreciation. In addition, most studies
Time (Q)
have been able to look at the micro
side of the housing issue. Howevconstruction and sales has had an immediate ecoer, data sources will force my study to take a more
nomic impact. A number of real-estate agents,
national level approach. In addition to looking at
mortgage brokers, investment bankers, movers,
more of the national side of the problem, I will
painters, contractors, landscapers, etc. are expeexamine a couple of new, untested variables as deriencing lower wages and even losing their jobs.
terminants of foreclosure and use the most recent
Because home sales and moves stimulate purchasforeclosure data.
es of appliances, electronics, and furniture, giant
Two complementary theories, option theochains like Home Depot and Sears have reported
ry and the ability-to-pay model, can best explain
sales down around 5%. In addition, auto sales
the underlings of the current foreclosure problem.
were down 12% in July 2007 from the previous
The basic premise of the option-based model is
year and consumers reported falling home equity
that borrowers have the option to default on their
and rising mortgage payments as a main reason
mortgage during each payment period (Quercia,
why (Gross, 2007).
2005). Borrowers believe they can benefit from
With all of this damage being done to the
clearing the value of their mortgage off the books
economy, an important question needs to be asked:
and gain free rent in their home between the time
What are the key determinants causing the current
they default and the actual event of foreclosure.
record number of foreclosures? To answer this,
The negatives of defaulting and going through
the study will use the most recent national foreclothe foreclosure process for the borrower include
sure data and attempt to find a model with results
giving up the house, costs of moving, losses of
that can be interpreted to suggest potential policy
attachable assets, lower credit rating, and any psyimplications. Section II of the paper describes
chological or moral costs of defaulting (Hender1.20
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shott, 1993).
Option theory stresses that when interest rates are declining/rising, borrowers have the
strong incentive to default/not default, especially
in regions where house prices are declining/rising
(Elmer, 2007). If home values fall sufficiently,
borrowers will “ruthlessly” exercise their option
to default (Cutts, 2005). The likelihood of default
increases as the market value of equity declines,
which occurs if either mortgage value increases or
property value decreases (Archer, 2002). However, even when in the money, borrowers may delay
or refuse the default option although it makes financial sense to do so, hoping the option becomes
even “deeper in the money” (Quercia, 2005; Pennington-Cross, 2006). These borrowers either
believe the negatives of defaulting outweigh the
costs or believe the volatility in the market could
make foreclosure even more attractive in the future.
A second theme of option-based models
is that prepayment and default are “competing”
risks. If one option is exercised, the other option is terminated. The option to prepay, a call
option, will be exercised when the borrower can
get a better deal on an interest rate after financing
costs. Competing options are especially relevant
now because prepayment penalties are common
with adjustable rate mortgages. The proportion
of subprime loans with prepayment penalties has
increased from about 50 percent in 1998 to 80 percent in 2000 (Quercia, 2005). Therefore, this factor limits a borrower’s ability to call a mortgage
and refinance to a lower rate.
When dealing with the option to default
and go through foreclosure, interest rates have a
substantial impact. When interest rates are increasing, the cost of borrowing money increases
so foreclosures should increase, ceteris paribus.
However, it is likely that there is a lag between the
time the interest rate increases and the time when
foreclosures becomes amplified. Adjustable rate
mortgages are likely to come with teaser rates,
below market interest rates, for a short period of
time and then will adjust to the higher market rate.

Therefore, the borrower is not likely to foreclose
until the interest rate jumps after a span of a few
years.
In addition to option-theory of default,
another common reason that individuals default
on mortgages is due to “trigger events.” This
view is characterized by the ability-to-pay model
which says a mortgagor will default whenever the
mortgagor’s current income after expenditures
falls below the amount of payment to mortgage
principal and interest (Barth, 1983). As defined
by Elmer, trigger events are “unanticipated shortfalls in income such that income is no longer sufficient to meet periodic debt obligations” (2007).
The sudden change then “triggers” default on the
mortgage. Therefore, income and expense-related
shocks such as job loss, divorce, or a death in the
family may lead to insolvency and mortgage default.
Higher unemployment rates should be an
acceptable proxy for labor market conditions and
the chance that the borrower himself faces this
situation. Danis and Pennington-Cross used unemployment rates lagged one month as a proxy
for trigger events and found surprisingly that foreclosures and unemployment are inversely related
(2005). This result differs from theory and natural
intuition. In addition, divorce can be a major financial stressor especially when alimony or child
support payments are involved. With the addition of a second house, living expenses tend to
increase dramatically without any corresponding
increase in wages. However, while the divorce
rate doubled between 1965 and 1976, it has since
varied by less than 10% and would not appear to
be a determinant causing the most recent increase
in foreclosures (Henderschott, 1993).
An issue that is related to trigger events is
the financial risk posture of households. Individuals choose their preferred level of savings and insurance to meet those unexpected shocks or “trigger” events. The likelihood that a trigger event has
a severe negative impact becomes greater as the
individual’s savings or insurance decreases. For
example, a lender might foreclose on one home
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and not another if the foreclosed home’s owner
has less readily available savings. The theory of
financial risk posture suggests a possible interaction between savings and unemployment rates
and their impact on foreclosures. In the United
States, consumer debt has reached historical highs
while the personal savings rate is at all-time lows
(Elmer, 2007). This recent trend of an extremely
low savings rate may be having a vast impact on
today’s record foreclosures.
On top of foreclosures caused by trigger
events, many argue that lenders are part of the current problem because of the recent development
of “predatory” lending tools. Lenders and borrowers have the option of using fixed-rate mortgages, adjustable-rate mortgages, hybrids of the
two, among other options. Adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs), sometimes referred to as a predatory lending instrument, first appeared after the
financial deregulation of 1980 and have quickly
become a popular mortgage alternative. In 1994
during a period of rising interest rates, 39% of all
mortgage originations were ARMs (Ambrose LaCour-Little, 2005). After the ARM share dropped
to around 10% during the late 1990’s, it shot back
up into its 1994 range during the start of the new
millennium. Below, Figure 2 shows the trend of
homebuyers financing through adjustable rate
mortgages.
Consumers are attracted to the lower initial interest rates of the ARM relative to fixedrate mortgages. For example, ARMs may be
especially attractive if they allow homebuyers to
have lower initial payments in areas where housing prices have appreciated rapidly (Merry, 2006).
Buyers may also be attracted to an ARM if they
don’t expect to live in the house for a very long
time frame. The buyer may take advantage of
the low teaser interest rate, hope that home values increase in the short term, and then sell the
house and cash out the increase in equity before
the teaser rate is increased after the initial two or
three-year period.
Lenders like the ARM because it puts the
interest rate risk squarely on the borrower. This
48

is a cost advantage to lenders who can then offer
lower rates to borrowers who accept a limited period of payment stability either because they don’t
plan to live in the house for long time or because
they are comfortable bearing the interest rate risk
(Ambrose Lacour-Little, 2005). Because of the
interest rate risk borne by borrowers in the face
of rising interest rates, one would expect that an
increase in ARMs relative to fixed rate mortgages
would increase foreclosures.
In addition, record gas prices may be having a negative impact on individuals’ ability to pay
mortgage payments. In recent years, national gas
price averages have shot skyward due to unrest in
the Middle East, hurricanes, and increased global
demand. This has caused a decrease in discretionary income. Due to American’s inelasticity with
respect to gasoline in the short-run, individuals
may face the choice of fueling up their vehicles
and heating their houses or paying their mortgage
payments on time. Some individuals may opt for
putting off the mortgage payment, hoping and betting that the bank won’t foreclose on their home.
This study hypothesizes that as national gas prices
increase, the number of foreclosure will also increase.
Finally, past research has indicated the
presence of several other possible determinants.
The most direct measure of equity in a home is
the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, which measures
the amount of the loan divided by the value of the
property (Elmer, 2007). Theory would indicate
that as LTV decreases, that is as the amount of the
loan decreases relative to the market value of the
home, foreclosure rates decrease. Homeowner
equity is also affected by the rate of appreciation
in house prices. High home appreciation accelerates the buildup of equity by reducing the current
LTV (Elmer, 2007). However, while the national
housing price index may be increasing to show
positive growth in house value, some borrowers
may be still at risk of losing their homes due to
regional housing market price declines (Henderschott, 1993). Overall, as the rate of home appreciation increases, foreclosures should decrease,
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III. Data
The data used in this study are obtained
from a variety of sources that cover the time period starting with the first quarter of 1995 and ending with the second quarter of 2007. LoanPerformance.com provides services detailing many
mortgage statistics and provided the data on foreclosures used in this study. I will use a quarterly
measure of the percentage of all loans in foreclosure at the end of the period for the United States
Mortgage Banker’s Association: National Delinquency Survey default.
One key determinant this study looks at is
the effect of the type of mortgage on subsequent
foreclosures. To measure this, I have gathered
data on the percentage of loans originated during a quarter that are adjustable rate
mortgages. Once a month, as part of
Figure 2: % of ARM
40%
the Weekly Primary Mortgage Market
35%
Survey, Freddie Mac collects the ARM
30%
share of applications, as reported by
25%
lenders who participate in the survey.
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15%
It is assumed that the rest of the perFigure 2: % of ARM
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measures.
Time (Q)
Mortgage interest rates were
also collected from Freddie Mac and
include both 30-year fixed rates and 1-year adMost of recent literature on foreclosures focuses
justable rate mortgages. Freddie Mac’s Primary
specifically on the subprime mortgage market.
Mortgage Market Survey also surveys lenders
The subprime market has rapidly expanded dureach week on the rates and points for their most
ing the last 20 years. The most typical impairment
popular 30-year fixed-rate, 15-year fixed-rate, 5/1
of these borrowers is a poor credit history; others
hybrid amortizing adjustable-rate, and 1-year amhave limited or no documentation on their income
ortizing adjustable rate mortgage products. The
or provide no down payment (Danis, 2005). Spesurvey is based on first-lien, prime conventional
cifically, Capozza and Thompson find that subconforming mortgages with a loan-to-value of 80
prime loans delinquent for 90 days are more than
percent. The interest rate spread and ARM movtwice as likely to be foreclosed on as prime loans
ing average used in this study were composed
(2006). Recent research on the subprime market
from this survey.
and the increased lending to this area has been
To measure the volatility of interest rates,
extensive and complex. Due to the complexity of
I will use the standard deviation in the London
the issue and the cost of accessing data related to
Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR index). The LIsubprime lending, this study will not focus on this
BOR is the rate of interest at which banks offer to
segment of the problem.
ARM share

ceteris paribus.
Some supply and demand theory is also
involved in the current foreclosure crisis. With so
many houses available on the market, builders and
potential sellers have to slash prices. These lower
aggregate prices are causing problems for borrowers who have home equity loans or were hoping to
“flip” the home, renovate it quickly and sell for a
profit. Nationally, house prices have fallen by 3%
and the amount of unsold homes has risen to the
equivalent of a 10-month supply, so selling one’s
home to cover the loss is nearly impossible. It is
easy to see and acknowledge the enormous problems that are rampant in the economy currently
and understand how they could become even
worse in the near future (“The Hammer”, 2007).
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lend money to one another in the wholesale money markets in London. It is a standard financial
index used in U.S. capital markets and is the index
that is used to set the cost of various variable-rate
loans. Lenders use such an index to adjust interest
rates as economic conditions change. Changes in
standard deviation of the LIBOR index will show
any shocks and volatility in interest rates.
Other measures of data come from various
sources. The measure of housing prices comes
from the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise
Oversight (OFHEO) that publishes a quarterly
House Price Index (HPI). Data on national unemployment rate (Bureau of Labor), national savings
rate (US Department of Commerce), and average
retail gas prices (US Department of Energy) were
obtained from various government bureaus. All
of the above data was in weekly or monthly form
and will be converted into quarterly measures for
the purpose of this study.
Finally, a measure of loan-to-value will
not be included because data on LTV ratios are
difficult to obtain on the national level and is better suited for microanalysis. The use of the quarterly House Price Index should be an acceptable
proxy for the measure of changes in the equity of
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American housing. Below, Table 1 provides descriptive statistics on the dependent and explanatory variables used in the model.
IV. Empirical Model
In order to best explain the determinants of
foreclosure, I will use the following independent
variables defined in Table 2: percentage share of
mortgage originations that are ARM, interest rate
spread, moving average of 1-year adjustable interest rate, ARM interest rate volatility, house price
appreciation, national unemployment rate, national savings rate, national retail gas prices, and
savings and unemployment rates interaction. The
dependent variable in my study is the quarterly
percentage of homes in the United States in the
foreclosure process.
I expect to find a positive sign for ARM
share because recent lending practices have created an environment where lenders offer relatively
lower “teaser” rates on adjustable rate mortgages. These teaser rates are priced at below market
interest rates for a period of two to three years.
Then the rates reset to the market rate, which is undoubtedly higher, creating more costly mortgage
payments. If the environment is such that interest
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rates are rising overall,
when the adjustable
rate becomes fixed after the period of two
or three years and is
readjusted to a higher
market rate, mortgage
payments will shoot
upward and the likelihood of default and
eventually foreclosure
will increase. This potential impact on foreclosures is most likely
to be seen after a lag of
two or three years. It is
unlikely that many individuals will want to
default on a mortgage
priced at a discount, but will be more likely to default when the interest rate on their loans becomes
much higher after the introductory, low teaser rate
period.
To look at the effect of interest rates on
foreclosure, I will examine three components: the
interest rate spread, adjustable mortgage interest
rate average, and the volatility of ARM rates. In
my model, I will include the interest rate spread
between the prevailing 1-year ARM rate and the
30-year fixed rate to proxy for the benefits of
switching from one type to the other. To measure
the effects of interest rates, I will simply use a
moving average of the ARM interest rate encompassing the last four quarters. Moving averages
are a good tool to smooth out short-term fluctuations, thus highlighting longer-term trends or
cycles. Using the last 4 quarters should allow a
large enough passage of time to account for readjustments of ARM into the changing market rates.
Finally, I will test the impact volatility of interest
rates has on foreclosures by using the standard deviation of the LIBOR rate over the period.
The percent of unemployed workers as
provided by the Bureau of Labor is used as a
proxy for the impact of trigger events. I would

expect the sign on this variable to be positive indicating that higher national levels of employment
are correlated with higher rates of foreclosure.
This relationship should be seen after a lag in time
because one would expect that individuals have
some savings to continue to make mortgage payments for a period of time after incurring job loss.
In theory, banks would not necessarily foreclose
immediately, but would instead wait and hope the
unemployed individual could rejoin the work force
and resume making mortgage payments. For that
reason, I will lag the unemployment variable one
quarter.
I expect the signs on both the national savings rate and house price appreciation measure
to be negative. As national savings increases,
people should have more in reserve if a trigger
event does occur or their mortgage payment does
increase. However, as consumption increases relative to saving, the likelihood of a trigger event
or increased mortgage payments having a detrimental effect increases. Like the unemployment
rate, I expect the national savings rate to have a
lagged effect on foreclosures, so the variable will
be lagged by one quarter.
Likewise, as the national House Price Index (HPI) increases, the relative value of Ameri-
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cans’ homes increase. This increases the equity in
homes and lowers the relative value of the mortgage and should lower the propensity to default
and have one’s mortgage foreclosed. However,
exceptions can occur with both savings and house
price variable on a regional level as home prices
and savings rate do vary based on location and
preferences. Again, the impact of the HPI may
be significant after a lag as it takes a while for homeowners to realize significant changes in home
equity.
Finally, the sign on the gas price variable
is expected to be positive. As national gas prices
increase, less money is available for individuals
to spend in other areas, including mortgage payments. This is due to Americans’ current inelasticity of demand on gasoline. Because so many
Americans rely on their vehicle for transportation
to and from work, school, family, events, etc., it is
not easy to just lower gasoline consumption when
prices increase. The added cost to buy gasoline
and related products could adversely lead families
into foreclosure.
This study will test the hypotheses below
by using the equation:
Foreclosure rate = f(ARM share, Unemployment
rate, Interest Rate Spread, Interest Rate Moving

52

Average, Interest Rate Volatility, House Price Appreciation, National Savings Rate, National Retail
Gas Price)
1. As the ratio of ARM to FRM loans increases
(ARM share), foreclosures will increase.
2. An increase in unemployment rates (lagged)
will increase the number of foreclosures.
3. An increase in national savings rate (lagged)
will decrease the number of foreclosures.
4. As housing appreciates nationally, the number
of foreclosures will decrease.
5. As national retail gas prices increase, foreclosures will increase.
V. Results
The regression results, presented in Table
3, show mixed results in relation to my testable
hypotheses. Table 3 presents the effects of the
explanatory variables on the dependent variable
(foreclosures).
Models A and B show the results from
my two best regressions. The results show that
foreclosures are dependent on the lagged share of
adjustable rate mortgages originated, current unemployment, moving average of adjustable mortgage rates, and the house price appreciation index
lagged one year. Personal savings rate, interest
rate spread, and ARM
interest rate volatility
were not found to be
significant
determinants of foreclosures
by my model. Gas
price was found to be
significant in a few of
the regressions, but its
results were anything
but robust. Therefore,
all of the above variables were removed
from Models A and B.
All of the coefficients in Table 3 have
the predicted sign and
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are significant at least to x=0.1. The difference in
lag time of the ARM share is what makes up the
difference in Model A versus Model B. Model A
contains an ARM share lag of two years, while
B uses a lag time of three years. Model A yields
an adjusted R-squared value of 0.680, indicating
that 68.0% of the variation in foreclosures is explained by the model. Model B explains 78.0% of
the variation in foreclosures. The variable coefficients in Model B are slightly stronger than in
Model A and the adjusted R-squared is significantly higher, both of which further the argument
that a three-year lag in ARM share origination explains a greater number of foreclosures.
Through the results shown by the coefficient on the interest rate moving average variable, one can see that an increase in the interest
rate increases the number of foreclosures. At first
glance, this result appears to be in conflict with the
hypothesis generated by option theory that states
borrowers will want to default when interest rates
are falling not rising. However, option theory assumes a fixed-rate mortgage, which would give
buyers incentive to default when interest rates are
declining, much the same as a company has the
incentive to call bonds back when interest rates
fall below the coupon rate. However, my empirical model is set up so mortgages are assumed to
be adjustable-rate. Therefore, the borrower does
not hope for rising interest rates because that will
only result in higher mortgage payments.
However, the ability-to-pay model and
more specifically, the impact of trigger events on
foreclosures were supported by the results of this
study. As current unemployment rates increase,
more people are unable to meet their mortgage
payments and subsequently have their homes
foreclosed. Also, my results agree with the work
done by Elmer who found that when home prices
are appreciating, less people have their homes
foreclosed due to increased equity build-up.
One potential problem with my data series is the possibility of autocorrelation occurring
in the models. Autocorrelation will often arise
when time-series data is used, as is the case in this

study. The Durbin-Watson test is the most common way to test for autocorrelation. After running
the Durbin-Watson test on Model B, it shows that
this model is narrowly within the test limits, and
autocorrelation is not present. However, the test
showed that autocorrelation is present in Model A.
When the Prais-Winsten test was used to correct
Model A for autocorrelation, both the ARM share
and House Price Appreciation variables were no
longer significant. Because the only difference
between Models A and B is the difference in ARM
share lag time, Model B with the three-year ARM
share lag continues to look like the best representative model for the determinants of foreclosure.
In relation to my five testable hypotheses,
I have found mixed results. The results involving ARM share, unemployment, and house price
appreciation variables came out virtually as predicted.
1.) An increase in the ARM share originated will
cause foreclosures to significantly increase in
three years.
2.) An increase in the national unemployment
rate will have an immediate, significant impact on
foreclosures.
3.) An increase in the HPI index will cause foreclosures to decline.
This study predicted that the increase in
foreclosures would be seen after a lag in the increase in the unemployment rate. However, the
increase is seen immediately as the current rate increases. This suggests the immediate devastation
a recession could cause on the housing market and
the lives of those who do lose their income due to
job reductions. Finally, the impact of a change in
the HPI index on foreclosures was not as immediate as predicted, but significant after a one-year
lag. This result makes sense because it takes time
to realize gains in equity.
On the other hand, the two other hypotheses did not turn out as predicted.
1.) The national, personal savings rate does not
have a significant impact on the number of foreclosures.
2.) Retail gas prices do not have a significant im-
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pact on the number of foreclosures.
While my study hypothesized that the impact of unemployment on foreclosures would be
lagged, the impact of unemployment was significant immediately, suggesting a possible interaction between unemployment and the low current
national savings rate. Because the national savings rate is so low, Americans do not have an adequate supply of funds to fall back on when they
lose their jobs. Therefore, I tried to model this
possibility by creating Model C which contains
all the variables previously found significant and
adds in (Savings)(Unemployment), which is an
interaction term that multiples the current unemployment rate with the current national personal
savings rate. Table 4 shows the results when
Model C was run using an OLS regression.
As Table 4 shows, all variables are still
significant at the 0.05 level and all coefficients are
similar to previous models. Model C explains an
impressive 81% of the variation in foreclosures
and is not influenced by autocorrelation. The new
(Savings)(Unemployment) interaction variable is
negative and significant. This suggests that unemployment’s positive influence on foreclosures is
mitigated when unemployment is interacted with
an increase in national savings rates. This supports the theory of financial risk posture that says
a trigger event, namely job loss, will have a much
smaller effect on an individual’s financial health if
54

they have a relatively greater amount in reserves
such as savings.
While the national savings rate alone did
not turn out to be a significant determinant in housing foreclosures in this study, I would not discount
its possible impact on the economy in the future.
Unless future savings rates differ greatly from the
current trend, they could have a significant impact
on the housing market and entire economy in the
near future due to the possible interaction with unemployment shown in Model C. The same can be
said for retail gas prices. Again, while not found
to be significant in this study, current prices almost daily reach all-time inflation adjusted highs.
If this trend continues, the impact could hamper
the economy, specifically the housing market in
the near future.
VI. Conclusions
The findings of this study extend the previous research done on the determinants of foreclosures, specifically with the result of ARM share.
The results indicate the significant, negative impact that adjustable rate mortgages can have on
the housing market and economy. Many market
analysts have described these adjustable interest
rate lending tools as “predatory.” The results of
this study would tend to support that claim. Future regulation needs to address the problems with
adjustable-rate mortgages including the low teaser
rates and balloon payments. Adjustable rate mortgages have and will continue to cause problems
for homeowners unless they are addressed by
government regulation.
In addition, this study found that unemployment has a significant, positive effect on foreclosures. This result goes along with theory and
natural intuition but against the results found by
a previous study done by Danis and PenningtonCross. This study also found a potential interaction effect between savings and unemployment
rates on foreclosures. The result of this interaction would indicate that in a country such as the
United States with low savings rates, a recession
could have more devastating effects on the econ-
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omy, especially in the area of home foreclosures,
than in a country with relatively higher savings
rates.
Future research dealing with the problems
associated with adjustable-rate mortgages is vital. This study did not even touch on the current
problems in the subprime housing market. Both
of these areas contain infinite possibilities for research. Possible work comparing and contrasting
the housing markets of different regions in the
United States or the determinants of foreclosure
between rural and urban areas could bring about
interesting results.
Finally, the sample size of data used in
this study was relatively small. Results could be
enhanced using monthly as opposed to quarterly
data to increase the number of observations. This
could be fairly easy to accomplish if one has access to monthly foreclosure data as that was the
one variable in this study that was exclusively
available in quarterly form.
Foreclosures have become an enormous
problem not just for individual families but also
for the entire well being of the United States economy. Understanding the determinants of foreclosures is vital to protect both individuals and the
economy from the negative consequences this issue triggers. Today, a recession looms due in large
part because of the housing crisis. The emergence
of a recession in the United States would exacerbate problems in the housing market that in turn
could initiate a vicious, circular pattern.
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